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Abstract—We present embedded devices memory elements -
from core registers to off chip-use, type and architecture before
summarising their features regarding extraction techniques at
scale. We list recent and on-going attack platform methodologies
prior analysing their pros and cons. Particularly of importance,
we address combined attack approaches, signal processing tech-
niques and the challenges of low cost extraction methodologies.
Above all, we characterise beam-based extraction techniques,
starting from sample preparation before concluding on in-situ
memory content extraction limits and countermeasures.
Index Terms—Memory content extraction, combined attack,
low cost approach, beam-based techniques
INTRODUCTION
Power efficiency, area, density, throughput, IP price are
common concerns when choosing storage elements for the
required application. Mainly due to integrated circuits field of
application (military, payment, healthcare, cyberphysical sys-
tem and other connected objects), hardware security is taking
a step forward at the design stage [1] to cover various physical
attacks [2]. While an algorithm is proven mathematically sure,
its hardware implementation made of transistors is subject
to perturbation (glitch, laser) or side-channel leakage (power,
time). Beside those attacks, there are also requirements in
terms of counterfeit protection and malicious circuits. EDA
tools security related capabilities are currently being developed
to make embedded system secure by design and avoid impos-
sible (hardware fix for next device versions only) or costly fix
(performance downgrade) situations.
When designing a new secure device and protecting it
against physical attacks, the first developed countermeasures
aim to eradicate product reverse engineering. Physical attacks
focus on the digital logic (including the core(s)) and mem-
ories. Some encryption/decryption blocks are implemented
using a certain number of interconnected standard cells.
They can be camouflaged at various hardware level (sili-
con, drain/source/gate, vias) [3]. Memory elements design
have evolved from visually distinguishable states (ROM) and
metal/poly fuses to electric charge/polarization states and anti-
fuse technologies. Countermeasures against in-situ extraction
techniques range from address scrambling at the hardware
level to software encryption/key derivation schemes.
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Design stage security principles are mainly based on se-
curity models that cover known vulnerabilities only. The
purpose of this work is to analyze current attacker capabilities
(with low cost means) and name some of the remaining
challenges for in-situ content extraction. We particularly point
out combined approaches and this article contributes to analyse
if low hanging fruits (best attacks in terms of cost, time and
efficiency) are hardware located as in recent attacks [4].
I. EMBEDDED DEVICE MEMORY
A. Role, application and type
Embedded devices memory elements range from single bit
registers (flip-flops) within the devices core(s), on-chip non
volatile (ROM/EEPROM/FLASH/eFuses) or volatile memory
(SRAM) to off-chip volatile memory (as DRAM in mobile
phone Package on Package (PoP)). Depending on their density
and time access, they are used as/for working registers, keys
storage, boot loaders, protection against firmware downgrade,
small variables and large data. Hardware extraction techniques
can be used as the last possible chance to extract information
from a secure device (security), from a damaged device
(forensic) or from a not functional/not completed device (man-
ufacturing). Security wise, in-situ memory content extraction
aims to access critical root of trust information or sensitive
algorithm/data/keys to facilitate combined physical attacks
or enables a software attack. Adding to the above list of
standard memory types, there are also emerging technologies
mainly enabling very low-power designs such as Phase Change
Memory (PCM), Ferroelectric RAM (FRAM), Magnetic RAM
(MRAM), Oxide-based RAM (OxRAM).
B. Structure, materials and vertical position
The standard structure of a 45nm and above (45nm cor-
responding to the transistor gates width) integrated circuit
(CMOS based) includes a Silicon substrate, doped areas (tran-
sistors’ drain and source), poly-Silicon (transistors’ gate) and
a stack of metal layers and dielectrics interconnected by vias.
Depending on the package type you can then find some vari-
ous elements such as the following ones for a 45nm FCBGA:
Passivation: Si3N4/SiO2/Si3N4 (0.6/0.1/0.6µm), Polyimide
(5µm), Die bumps, PCB substrate and Copper balls. While
the thickness of each layer of the device starts only from
0.2µm, the area typically covers 6000µm by 8000µm and
depends on the complexity of the device (evaluated in kGE
(Gate Equivalent)). The Si. substrate is 650µm thick.
At the time being, memory information is either stored at
the top of the device (e.g. MRAM/OxRAM (large elements),
BEOL: Back-End-Of-Line) or more commonly below the first
metal layer (e.g. FRAM, FEOL: Front-End-Of-Line). For any
of the given memory type, the in-situ extraction technique has
to be evaluated according to the following criteria:
• Is a direct access to the storage layer required?
• Is the required sample preparation expensive/hard?
• Can the technique scale in terms of speed, area?
• What are the techniques limits (efficiency, process)?
• Can the raw extraction technique be combined (e.g. signal
processing, error correction, multiple samples)?
C. In-situ extraction techniques
Hardware in-situ extraction techniques may target embed-
ded devices for which security is essential, the tools behind
such extraction can thus be costly such as the following ones:
• Photon-emission analysis (SRAM) [5].
• Focused Ion Beam (FIB) extract. (and mod.) (Fuses) [6].
• X-ray (ptychography) memory modification (SRAM) [7].
However, those setup are either expensive, not open source
or not demonstrated on recent technology node devices. Sim-
ilarly to active circuit electromagnetism observation, Xray
methods are very interesting due to their application through
the device package (non invasive). At the moment, the demon-
strated technique requires a synchrotron, time and expertise but
multiple electron sources based Xray characterizion re being
developed [8]. Also, in the field, there are current development
in laser platform with thick substrate capability or multiple
beam spots.
D. Towards low-cost and combined techniques
We also see the development of low cost laser setups, that
follows low cost approach used in other field such a powerful
paper based microscope [9] or motorized stage [10]. Having
low-cost approaches directly impact attacks classification. We
also see the advances in signal processing techniques and for
instance the efforts in the field of biology that can be, brought
and enhanced for hardware security applications. Combined
techniques from hardware security, forensic analysis and fail-
ure analysis (including debug and test) communities are also
an interesting approach.
In the next section, we bring together methods to access the
layer of interest where the memory information is, no matter
the type of package and the type of memory.
II. DEVELOPPING LOW COST MEMORY LAYER ACCESS
A. Die frontside and backside opening
For in-situ memory content extraction requiring a direct
access to the layer where the information is stored (for
instance at the transistors gate level), one also has to remove
the component from its package. Packages vary from chip
modules, QFN like package with multiple external pins and
(a) Smart card mod-
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Fig. 1: Embedded system depackaging
Ball Grid Arrays. Nowadays, for cost reduction, most of the
chip in modules or BGA are said flip-chip. Opening the device
from the front of the package would give access to the back
of the chip itself (the substrate), Fig. 1a. The die extraction
is realized with a sharp knife (smart card module) only or
simply combined with a hot plate (FCBGA) to first remove
the die from the PCB and then grind connecting Cu balls. A
complete wet etching backside removal while protecting edges
would also be of interest for the community.
Depending on the application, it is already possible to
look through optically transparent material (polyimide and
passivation) for the FCBGA device, right image of Fig. 1.
On this particular image, one can notice three gray rectangles
corresponding to three balls (removed) localization. Various
structures can be seen enabling the identification/localisation
of certain type of memory close to the top metal layer.
B. Destructive access to transistor’s active region (frontside)
On Fig. 2, one can identify standard differences between
the smart card module and the FCBGA. Those images are
obtained after wet etching (HF acid) where only active regions
remain. For the FCGBA, the technology process is smaller (45
vs 90nm), there are usually no well taps and countermeasures
are not present against invasive attacks (reverse engineering).
The technique only requires HF acid (few minutes bath),
acetone, ultrasonic rinsing bath and a nitrogen gun to rinse
the circuit. The sample preparation is easy, fast and efficient
no matter the size of the circuit and the technology node.
(a) A smart card IC (b) A processor
Fig. 2: Frontside Scanning Electron Microscopy (active layer)
A small modification on the methodology could be brought
to conserve Tungsten plugs (M1 contacts) if necessary. For
instance it could enable with a successive electron beam
imaging the extraction of ROM contents if encoded at this
layer or more importantly, provide access to other type of
memory present below the first metal layer.
C. Invasive access to transistor’s active region (backside)
Another approach is to let the metal layers on the circuit
and apply low-cost methods to remove all Silicon substrate to
access transistors layer from the backside. Manual sandpaper
polishing (with various grit) combining with Colloidal Silica is
a possibility while polishing machine can also be used. A final
selective Si/Sio2 etch (Choline hydroxide) permit to remove
the remaining Silicon substrate.
However, the task is complicated for large package. Indeed,
there is a die curvature due to the packaging process. While the
goal is to only have few µm of Silicon remaining on the chip,
there can be tens of µm difference between the circuit center
and its sides. One solution is adaptive CNC milling. Also, one
can note that some expensive tools (100kEuros) including an
interferometer for local measurement can remove Silicon down
to few µm over the whole area of a circuit. Backside access
is very promising as the device could remain functionnal (if
some tens of nm are left on the circuit), left image on Fig. 3.
It could also enable to analyze the logic located next to a
memory or find where memory elements such as flip-flops
are located on the chip and how memory related elements
are connected together, right image on Fig. 3. This image is
obtained with Backscattered Electrons (BSE) detector giving
more sub-surface information.
(a) Seeing through few nm of Si. (b) BSE image example
Fig. 3: Backside Scanning Electron Microscopy (active layer)
After presenting low cost backside and frontside access, we
introduce some of our current in-situ memory memory content
extraction techniques. Those extraction techniques are low-
cost, large area compliant and fast.
III. EXTRACTION/CHARACTERIZATION TECHNIQUES
A. Various memory elements
Table I presents the different memory types that can be
found in a circuit. While ROM, doped ROM and Fuse elements
have been widely reverse engineered using sample preparation
and imaging capabilities, the next step is to further analyse
their respective replacing technologies; EEPROM/FLASH and
Antifuse. Particularly of interest are antifuse technologies due
to manufacturers security statement and emerging ChipLock
technology [11]. An additional step would be to assess emerg-
ing nonvolatile memory in-situ extraction, the main partic-
ularity is to access where the information is stored. In-situ
TABLE I: Memory type analysis
Storage Features
Element Storage type Localization Volatile?
ROM OTP by material FEOL or BEOL No
Doped ROM OTP by doping FEOL No
EEPROM Electric charge FEOL No
FLASH Electric charge FEOL No
SRAM Memory based FEOL Yes
DRAM Capacitance FEOL Yes
FRAM Polarization FEOL No
PCM Material Phase FEOL No
MRAM Magnetic orientation BEOL No
CBRAM Electric resistance BEOL No
OxRRAM Electric resistance BEOL No
Flip-flop Memory based (logic) FEOL No
Fuse Open/Short FEOL or BEOL No
Antifuse Oxide breakdown FEOL No
ChipLock Multi-layer pattern FEOL & BEOL No
single extraction from DRAM (volatile and mainly data) is not
practical. DRAM would instead require techniques developed
in the forensic analysis field (not cell level extraction).
B. Electric charge characterization using Scanning Electron
Microscope
SEM based techniques (without nanoprobes) benefit from
the capability to define an area (with a certain magnification
and overlay) that will be automatically acquired without op-
erator interaction (unlike Atomic Force Microscopy (AFM)
approaches). One of the application is EEPROM/Flash content
extraction [12] and it benefits from both SEM capabilities and
offline image processing techniques. We show on Fig. 4 the
capability to perform such memory content extraction over two
successive acquired EEPROM area.
Fig. 4: Multi-area EEPROM extraction using SEM
C. Laser based reverse engineering
A laser scanning technique (with no high spatial and tem-
poral precision setup) has been tested over SRAM memory
cells, Fig. 5a. The device is ON and the power line of
the device is monitored. A continuous laser beam interfers
with each element of the memory and the power signal is
retrieved and plotted. One can notice that no matter the timing
approximation between each line of power analysis, standard
open source technique can permit to correctly align each line to
each other. The drawback of laser based reverse engineering
is its impact on the device’s power line that can be easily
detected (the device has to be in ”ON” for memories such as
SRAM), thus limiting the field of application. However, this
technique could be further extended to some targets in the IoT
regime not particularly (yet?) aware of such hardware flaw.
(a) Raw scan (b) Re-aligned scan
Fig. 5: SRAM cells Laser Scanning Microscopy (LSM)
D. Flip-flop encryption/state extraction
While full reverse engineering remain too costly in terms
of skills, equipment and time, partial reverse engineering is an
interesting first step for combined attack, memory state extrac-
tion and hardware crypto/encryption accelerator analysis. We
developed a machine learning based analysis of pattern present
at the transistors active layer, Fig. 6. We are able to draw
statistics within a single chip, from a chip to another and so on.
Experiments and classifications are still undergoing regarding
memory related logic circuitry. Machine learning can also
enable to resolve ultrafast electron microscope scans or low
resolution optical images (also applying a specific solution
over the device can help increasing the image resolution).
It particularly becomes of interest following the advances
of open source hardware based on RISC-V Instruction Set
Architecture (ISA). For the SoC device under test, parameters
were the following:
1) Time per pixel (dwell): 1µs, res.: 3072 * 2048 pixels
2) Complete chip size: 142k * 159k pixels (9.3 *10.4 mm)
3) Acquis. time: 8.5 hours (Overlap: 10%), Align.: 5 Min.
Fig. 6: Chip area subset single cell localization extraction
Recent advances in multi-electron beam (91 beams) reduce
such time acquisition to less than 10 minutes. We use offline
tools for image alignment after obtaining artifacts using closed
source proprietary SEM software.
E. Combining multi-field approaches
Remaining challenges vary from the application on re-
cent products of non-volatile memory extraction, eFuse in-
situ extraction, large scale caracterization of hardware based
encryption techniques and the use of other failure analysis/chip
debugging tools. There is also a strong interest for low-cost
sample preparation (chemistry and polishing) allowing any
CMOS circuit preparation. Similarly, sample preparation on
devices with an insulator structure (BOX) above the substrate
could be characterized. Other type of failure analysis, chip
manufacturing tools and caracterization techniques need to be
studied. For instance, the state of the art does not cover if stan-
dard laboratory available laser based technique (raman, ellip-
someter) or scanning near- field optical microscopy (SNOM)
are possible in-situ memory content extraction tools. At last,
presented techniques have mostly been demonstrated on a
subset of the device under test, there is a demand for global
application and preferably on current process nodes/devices
to analyze techniques pros and cons and define necessary
countermeasures. While state of the art countermeasures might
lock most exploits for a single type of attack (side channel,
fault), another interesting path is combined approaches. For
instance, combining physical attacks to make debug interfaces
accessible could be beneficial for an attacker. There is also a
particular interest with techniques coming from the forensic
analysis world (e.g. chip off techniques).
CONCLUSION
This paper gives a study of the various type of memory ele-
ments present in any embedded devices and their localization
in the hardware stack. We present some of our latest advances
in low cost, fast and efficient approaches combining sample
preparation and beam based (electron, laser) techniques for
memory content extraction. Some of the numerous remain-
ing challenges are introduced and we particularly point out
the interest of combined approaches. Moving to an era of
uniqueness and specialization (and open source hardware) for
more speed and less power consumption push even further
the questions related to hardware security and in-situ memory
content extraction techniques.
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